Summary We generalize the characterization of the loan contract due to Gale and Hellwig(1985) to the case of risk aversion of the borrower and diverse subjective beliefs about the outcome of the investment. We continue to assume costly state verification (Townsend, 1979) i.e. that the lender must incur costs in order to observe the outcome of the project. Contract terms now reflect returns on capital as well as risk sharing and trade on the differences in probabilities. Because there are no financial markets where agents could purchase insurance for state contingencies, private contracting replaces markets for contingent claims. This also means that verification states are not necessarily interpreted as "default" states. We characterize the optimal contract showing that (i) the contractual payoff in verification states varies by states in accord with risk aversion and probability belief of the two parties, and (ii) the verification region may consist of several intervals. We provide conditions and examples to show that when the borrower is more optimistic than the bank, there may be fewer verification regions.
interval, S \ S * of high investment returns where no state verification takes place. If s ∈ S * , the borrower is in default and consumes nothing while the bank receives the available resources.
For s ∈ S \ S * the payment to the bank is a constant independent of the state and the borrower receives the balance.
Gale and Hellwig briefly considered how the contract might change if the borrower is risk averse. Garino and Simmons(2006) study in further detail the optimal contract when the borrower is risk averse but both papers assume that the borrowers and the bank hold the same probability beliefs about the state. Assuming the verification cost is independent of the state, they show that when the borrower is risk averse he consumes a constant positive quantity when the state is verified and he is in default (i.e. there is default insurance), but the verification regions, S * is still an interval of low return states. There is no reason to believe an optimizing entrepreneur is less risk averse than any other economic agent, and hence Gale and Hellwig's (1985) and Garino and Simmons'(20001) discussions of risk aversion reflect a desire to adapt the model to more realistic conditions. The assumption that the bank is risk neutral is realistic due to the bank's diversified loan portfolio, but this fact brings out a fundamental aspect of the contract. The bank's ability to diversify enables it to become an insurance agent for a risk averse borrower. The need for such insurance arises from the non-existence of markets for contingent claims which is due to asymmetric information. This means that private contracting between the borrower and the bank becomes an institution used to improve risk sharing arrangements that should ideally be performed via financial markets. But then the simple borrower-lender relationship no longer characterizes the problem; rather the relationship has become multifaceted. Nevertheless, under the assumptions of Gale and Hellwig(1985) and Garino and Simmons(2006) , the formal structure of the standard loan contract remains intact.
Our interest in this paper is to extend the analysis of Gale and Hellwig(1985) to an environment where the borrower is risk averse but where he also has a probability belief about the distribution of the state s which is different from that of the bank. In that case, in some states the agreed compensation may not be connected with the real outcome of the project but rather, it may be due to the differences in probabilities on which the parties trade. With this in mind, it may not be useful to think of S * as a set of default states. Instead, S * is the set of states in which the contract stipulates a payoff to the borrower that exceeds the project's resources 1 If there are any non-verification states, then due to the bank's verification costs, there will typically be minus the fixed obligation to the bank. The insuring agent then makes a demand for payment by the lender to cover his costs. More generally, the constraints do not prohibit the borrower from receiving a compensation which is even larger than the total resources of the entire project.
In fact, for both the original Gale and Hellwig model and ours, the contract may be thought of as being composed of two contracts, one that in return for a loan from the the bank offers a state independent future payment to the bank and another which is an insurance contract with establishes state dependent pay-outs. Monitoring is then used to certify whether the insured event did or did not happen. These two contracts are necessarily linked because (under an assumption of non-negative consumption) the promises of the pure loan contract are not feasible without the insurance contract, thus the loan contract will stipulate that an insurance contract be signed. The linkage is only one-way however and with subjective expectations, under some circumstances, an insurance contract may be signed even when there is no lending by the bank.
Seen in this light a natural question is then, whether the two contracts necessarily have to be offered by the same financial institution? We argue informally that consolidating the two contracts into one has the advantage to the bank of guaranteeing that the second contract (in its stipulated format) is in fact in place and of making the risk profile of the insured known. If there are fixed costs associated with writing up a contract this may be a further reason why a single contract is preferable.
To explain the issue further, consider the case when S * is an interval of lowest returns. Due to risk aversion (and possibly, probability differences) the lender proposes to insure the borrower in terms of a specified payoff function on S * . In addition, suppose there is another region S * * , not connected with S * , on whose realization the lender puts very small probability but the borrower very high probability. The borrower may ask to receive a large compensation on S * * and, in addition, that on S * * the project should have no obligation to the bank. The lending bank may be willing to guarantee the borrower this compensation package simply because he does not believe that these outcomes are likely. If the lender can lower the amounts proposed to the borrower at S * (a region of high probability for him) in exchange for higher promises on the set S * * (a region of low probability for him), such a trade would keep the expected return of the lender at the same level and increase the utility of the borrower. One may then argue that trading on probability differences introduces an element of "speculation" something which is not the proper function of a lending bank. But this is exactly the point at which the bank's motive to maximize expected return alters its simple role as a loan provider and turns it into a trading partner in an environment of incomplete markets.
It is worth noting that in recent years many economists have adopted the view that incomplete markets should not be characterized only by an absence of financial markets to trade risk but also by the emergence of private institutions to supplement trading opportunities available in the market. Indeed, some theorists consider contracting to be the correct way to model incomplete markets (e.g. Atkeson and Lucas, 1992, Cole and Kocherlakota, 2001 ). Without addressing this deeper question of selecting optimal private institutions to trade risk, we note that a crucial feature of contracting with risk aversion and diverse probability beliefs is the fact that it offers a substitute for financial markets, and the possibility of multiple regions of verification simply reflects the complex nature of trading it implies. As was already noted, in the environment we consider the financial contract is a bundle who's elements cannot easily be separated.
2 Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist(1999) use the contracting model to develop a financial accelerator and in applying the model to the U.S. economy take an extreme position on this issue. They argue that in advanced economies there always exists intermediation between the ownership of capital and the management of capital, hence all public capital ownership is covered by the state verification model! They thus do not distinguish between equity and debt investments since they are both subject to state verification. However, the Gale and Hellwig(1985) assumptions, adopted by Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist(1999) , seem to lead to a too simple contract rather than the very complex set of contingent obligations and payments, typical associated with capital investment. Despite this shortcoming, the approach by Bernanke and Gertler (1989) Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist(1999) , and Carlstrom and Fuerst(1997) has become influential in the macroeconomic literature since it offers a relatively simple way of introducing into a new Keynesian model a role for the financial markets and in particular the possibility that these markets are accelerating, i.e. magnifying, real shocks to the economy.
Our intuition is that when entrepreneurs are optimistic, as we assume here, the accelerator affect will tend to become more pronounced, since the entrepreneurs tend to take on more risk than they otherwise would.
Our interest in contrasting with the established literature naturally lead us to adopt one common assumption there, namely that monitoring is non-stochastic. However, both Townsend (1979) and, for a more general case, Mookherjee and Png(1989) showed that the optimal contract in general involves stochastic monitoring. This means that a contractual format quite different from the standard loan contract of Gale and Hellwig(1985) emerges. Conceptually it is not straight forward to allow for stochastic monitoring in a setting with subjective beliefs like ours. In particular, the lender and borrower may disagree about the probabilities of default and they might see an advance in letting the monitoring depend on an event, which the 2 Note that this way of thinking about the borrower-lender relationship may then also provide a perspective on the ongoing discussion about the merits of funding via equity markets as compared to via investment banks (and more recently investment funds). The latter may be attractive exactly because it simultaneous serves several needs of the firm.
lender think has small probability and the borrower has high probability. The issue is further complicated by another assumption common to both the models of Gale and Helllwig(1985) and Mookherjee and Png(1989) namely that the lender can commit to monitor. In the first place if the decision to monitor is not triggered by a commonly observable event, it becomes more difficult to confirm that the commitment is fulfilled. Secondly, in the case of delegated monitoring there is when all parties have subjective beliefs a further source of complications in determining the optimal form of monitoring and controlling that it is implemented. In fact Mookherjee and Png(1989) themselves suggest that the format of the standard loan contract may be explained by simplicity and simplicity may also be the reason why deterministic monitoring is used. Finally, since a major motivation for extending the Gale-Hellwig model was to understand how subjective beliefs may affect the financial accelerator, we find it useful to retain the assumption of non-stochastic monitoring used in f.i. Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) .
In generalizing the Gale and Hellwig model, there are many sound reasons to focus on the case where the lender is more optimistic than the bank. Firstly, there is vast empirical evidence that agents exhibit diverse probability beliefs in financial markets (see, for example, Foot(1987),(1990) , Frankel and Rose(1995) , Kandel and Pearson(1995) , Kurz(2001) and Takagi(1991) ). Secondly, if potential entrepreneurs have diverse beliefs about available projects, we would expect that investors who are pessimistic about the outcomes of potential projects would generally choose not to invest at all. Thirdly, the case of differences in probability beliefs is a relatively simple setting of trading where we could hope to derive the optimal contract and even be able to solve it numerically. Other settings may be too complex to enable a full characterization of the optimal contract. And, indeed, our conclusions are relatively simple and can be summarized as follows:
(A) The contractual payments to the borrower in verification states are not constant, unless he and the bank agree on probability assessments: They vary by states in accord with risk aversion and probability beliefs of the borrower and lender.
(B) The observation region may consist of several intervals and the structure of these intervals is sensitive to the differences in probability beliefs.
The contract feature described in (A) has substantial empirical evidence to support it, since even in states of "default" the consumption level of a borrower is not constant. There are items (e.g. home) not subject to seizure by lender; in some states the borrower may default only on some loans which are not backed by collateral. Finally, depending on the severity of the situation (i.e. depending on s), if the borrower is unable to pay all his debts then under Chapter 11 he may be able to renegotiate the loan contracts and emerge with a positive consumption.
The feature described in (B) reflects the trading possibilities which private contracting makes possible.
Characterization of the Solution to the Contracting Problem
Here the case where the payoff to a risk averse borrower is not required to be monotonic is being studied All functions and sets are required to be measurable. We start with five assumptions but add more later to facilitate the development.
A.2 The bank is risk neutral;
A.3 The probability measures P and P B are equivalent;
3 Garino and Simmons(2006) explore the implication of permitting the borrowing entrepreneur to destroy revenue and this results in an monotonic payoff function to the borrower.
4 It is straightforward to see that in the region where there is no observation, since the bank relies on the report of the borrower, the payment to the bank must be constant, so that ν(s) = F (s, B + n) − R in this region.
Without loss of generality we now let S be the support of P (or equivalently of P B ).
A.5 S is connected and contains 0;
We are mainly interested in characterizing the optimal contract, whenever it exists, and could therefore at the present level of generality consider the case also of risk neutral borrowers.
However, we consider this case as not of much interest, since even if an optimal contract exists, it will tend to be rather extreme, its format being driven by differences in opinions.
In the way we shall formulate the contract design problem we are implicitly assuming that beliefs are known. This may seem an extreme assumption, but less so when taking into account that there is, in the background of our analysis, an assumption of competitive markets. This is why we shall assume a zero profit participation constraint for the bank. We think of a situation with many competing banks, that may have different beliefs about the type of project offered by the entrepreneur. Each of them will accept any contract that according to their belief offers an expected return equal to zero. The entrepreneur will then choose the bank willing to accept the in his view most favorable contract. Assuming that there are many banks of each belief type, the zero profit condition must then hold in equilibrium. Note that the banks then have no interest in knowing the entrepreneur's belief (which might in any case be retrieved from the contract he proposes).
A simple tool for characterizing the Solution of the Contracting Problem
We start with a formal statement of the contracting problem which is:
subject to
In this problem a feasible contract is one that pays a non-negative amount to the entrepreneur in any state (which could be interpreted as limited liability). The first constraint, ( 2 ) describes the participation constraint of the bank, ensuring the bank a normal return, (3) is the incentive compatibility constraint making it unprofitable for the borrower to misrepresent the truth by claiming that a state in S * belongs to S \ S * , while (4) is a feasibility constraint on the contractual value of R.
5
We denote byν,S * ,R,B a solution to this problem (which we throughout shall assume exists, unless otherwise specified). Note the in many instances the solution is not unique but is a class of probabilistic equivalent solutions. Our strategy for characterizing a solution to (1) - (4) is to define a simpler problem who's solution is part of the solution to the original problem. Thus, for given C and k ∈ + , denote byν C (·, k) the solution to the following problem (5) -(6) (whenever it exists):
Problem (5) - (6) is much simpler than problem (1) -(4) and we shall find first order conditions for it. Note that for any measurableS,ν C (·, k) restricted toS is the solution to
Let C and k be given such that (5) -(6) has a solution (i.e. S F (s, C) ≥ k). With S 0δ = {s ∈ S :ν C (s, k) > δ} we then have the following necessary condition for optimality: For any measurable A, B ⊂ S and > 0 such that P (B) > 0 and
Dividing by and taking limits we conclude that in the case where P (B ∩ S 00 ) = P (B) > 0 :
5 Note that we implicitly assume a penalty for falsely claiming a state in S * (which will always be revealed) sufficiently high to deter such misreporting.
The key tools to characterizing the solution to the contracting problem are Lemmas 1 and 2, both of which involve standard arguments. They show the format of the payoff function in the optimal verification set,S * .
Lemma 1
s.
Proof: We first prove monotonicity by use of the first order conditions, (8) and (9). Thus sup-
We have P (B) > 0. Suppose P (A) > 0 with the purpose of arriving at a contradiction. Using
Next using (9) we have:
. We thus conclude that P (A) = 0. This proves almost sure monotonicity.
there must be some measurable set B with P (B ) > 0 s.t. on B , ν >ν C (·, k). But this is in contradiction with the almost sure monotonicity that was just established, since then there would be a measurable subset of B with P -positive measure on which for large n, Select ν(·) ≥ 0, measurable and defined onS * which maximizes:
Remark 1 tells us that (12) is non-binding forν. Letν solve max (10) subject to (11). Ifν =ν on a set inS * of positive measure then
This follows from strict concavity of u. Suppose then, with the purpose of obtaining a contra-
For small > 0, modifyν L as follows: 
with strict inequality in a set of positive P -measure. Hence we have
which implies that
However, by construction λν + (1 − λ)ν fulfills the two constraints (11) and (12). This contradicts the fact thatν was a solution to (10) - (12) and it must be the case thatν =ν onS * .
What remains to be shown is that for somek
Clearly, as k ↑ ∞ 0 F (s,C)P (ds),νC(·, k) ↓ 0, P -a.s. which means S * νC (s, k)P B (ds) ↓ 0. On the other hand, as k ↓ −∞,νC(·, k) ↑ ∞, P -a.s. by the same argument used earlier to prove monotonicity in Lemma 1. Lemma 1 establishes the pointwise continuity ofνC, hence the continuity (in k) of S * νC (s, k)P (ds) so (by the intermediate value theorem) it follows that there is ak such that S * νC (s,k)P (ds) = S * F (s,C)P (ds) −k
SinceνC(·,k) is the unique solution to the problem max S * u[ν(s)]P B (ds) subject to S * ν(s)P (ds)
≥ S * νC (s,k)P (ds), (13) follows Lemma 2 has a simple interpretation. Since inS * the state is known, the problem restricted toS * is an optimization with full information. Hence the borrower's consumption must be optimal only subject to the participation constraint of the bank i.e. to the condition thatk is the level that assures the bank's participation. Given that this conditions is satisfied, the optimality condition (8) simply reflects the risk aversion and probability belief of the borrower as well as the probability belief of the bank. We recall that for the case where the borrower is risk averse but holds the same probability belief as the bank, Gale and Hellwig(1985) and Garino and Simmons(2006) show the solution isν = constant for s ∈S *
. If the agent is risk neutral and holds the same probability belief as the bank then we have the standard loan contract whereν(s) = 0, s ∈S * . The new dimension here is the diversity of probability beliefs between the bank and the borrower.
Lemma 2 enables us to show that when sufficient smoothness is assumed, the solution to
(1) -(4) can be characterized with elementary techniques of calculus.
Necessary Conditions for the optimal solutionν
We have already derived in (8) and (9) necessary conditions for problem (5) -(6). We now combine with the previous lemma to derive necessary conditions for problem (1) -(4).
Necessary Conditions for an Optimal Pay-off Functionν
For all measurable A, B ⊂S *
If P and P B are differentiable in s and s , so that they have densities p and p B defined in s and s , (14) can be rewritten in the form
Note that when P B = P , (14) implies thatν is a.e. constant onS * as in Gale and Hellwig(1985) .
Note also that when p B and p are continuous, so is, a.e.,ν restricted toS * .
Given the choice of capital,C =B +N , a contract specifiesS * ,k andR withν(s) =νC(s,k)
for s ∈S * andν(s) = F (s,C) −R for s ∈ S ⊂S. Hence, we can develop necessary conditions for optimality in terms of the three choice variables, S * , k, and R. First, we make additional assumptions:
A.6 F is continuous and weakly increasing in s.
A.7 c is continuous in s and c(·, C) > 0, ∀s ∈ S, ∀C > 0.
A.8 P B and P have densities, p B and p which are continuous.
Notice that we can always reorder S, in order to obtain A.6.
The assumption that c(·, C) > 0 is made for simplicity and our results could be derived with the less strict condition that {s ∈ S : c(s, C) = 0} be independent of C . In that case
we would have to restrict the analysis to the set where c(s, C) > 0, ∀C, knowing that on the complement set, there will always be observation. 
Proof: We consider throughout the proof a continuous version ofνC(·,k). We first prove (16) by contradiction. Thus suppose that s ∈ intS ∩S * and that P (S *
and
(s,C)}p(s)
and, for sufficiently small ∈ (0, ), define implicitly δ( ) andδ( ) as follows: The change in the profit of the bank is for ∈ (0, ) and small:
while the change in utility of the entrepreneur is:
To get the desired contradiction we need to show that there is > > 0 s.t.δ( ) < δ( ) i.e.
such that not only is the changes feasible but we can, by adding some to the payment to the entrepreneur, make him strictly better off.
Letting λ be Lebesgue measure, we have
Using the identitŷ
Since the expression in the last line, tends to 0 as → 0 and thusδ( ) tends to 0, to show that the total expression is eventually negative, we need only show that as → 0,δ
stays bounded. However, this follows since we havê
for small. Thus we have arrived at the desired contradiction.
Remark: Note that ifνC(ŝ,k) = F (ŝ,C) −R the inequality in (16) cannot hold in a neighborhood ofŝ.
The proof of the other inequality, (17) is essentially identical: Suppose we had > 0 in (17) and let s ∈ intS ∩ (S \S * 
) and assume that P ((S \S
and define for sufficiently small > > 0, δ( ) by:
and (for sufficiently small > > 0) letδ( ) be defined by:
Both parties are then not worse off with these changes and as before we need to show feasibility, i.e. that there is > 0 s.t.δ( ) > δ( ).
Similarly to before we get
which is now > 0 for small , where again we use thatδ
stays bounded as → 0
The interpretation of (16) and (17) is relatively simple and follows from the manner in which they were derived. The first term in (16) describes the gain in expected utility per unit of extra expected money spent on including the state s in the set of observation. The second term quantifies the gain in expected utility per unit of expected money spent on increasing the payment to the entrepreneur marginally on the set of observation. In a state of observation the first minus the second has to be positive. In a state of non-observation, it has to be negative (else that state would have to be included inS * ). The gap between the return of the entrepreneur in the observation set and outside it, present at the boundaries of these sets can be explained as follows. Suppose we hadνC(s ,k) = F (s ,C) − R and s ∈S * . If we makeS * smaller we save a positive observation cost, while the change in utility of the entrepreneur is small. Consequently, this change is feasible and obviously welfare increasing (because observation costs are reduced).
Under the assumptions stated in the proposition we have a corollary which summarizes the optimal contract over the entire state space (retainingν as being the payment to the borrower in any state s).
Corollary 1
For an optimal contract, (C,k,S * ,R) with P (S * ) > 0 and P (S \S * ) > 0, we have:
(ii)ν(s) = F (s,C) −R and s ∈ S \S * for P-a.a. s satisfying either:
The Corollary then follows from the discussion before Proposition 1 and the Proposition itself
Further Characterization of the Optimal Contract
Suppose now that the set of s s.t.
has P-measure 0. Then the previous Corollary provides a complete characterization of the optimal contract.
Corollary 2
Suppose the set where (18) holds has measure 0. ThenS * is either empty or a union of intervals:
Proof: The set where F (s,C) −R ≤ 0 is, unless empty, by assumption A.6 a closed interval. If not empty, the set whereνC(s,k) > F (s,C) −R ≥ 0 and
is, by continuity, a union of intervals. constraint is thus always slack (in a strong sense) whenνC(s,k) > 0 P -a.s. which is certainly the case when P B = P (because of risk aversion) and thus also the case when P B and P are not too different.
This is similar to a statement in Garino and Simmons(2006) that the incentive compatibility constraint is slack. However, we should note that their model is not exactly identical to ours since (i) the ability of the entrepreneur to repay in our case may depend on the investment in the project, C + N = B and (ii) the observation costs in our model may depend on the state, while it is independent of the state in Garino and Simmons. The analysis in Garino and Simmons(2006) that leads to their conclusion is not formally correct. In the appendix, A.3.4 (p. 104 ) they claim to demonstrate that it is not possible to have the payment to the entrepreneur equal to 0 in states of observations and to have s * = R. This claim is based on an analysis of the
where H is the distribution function for the state variable s and L is the size of the loan. Also (equation (1), p. 
77) they assume S sH(ds)−c > L(1+i). It follows that R
U 0 (0) = (1+i)L > 0 and as s → sup S, R U 0 (s) → −∞.
Corollary 4
The following two conditions together imply thatS * is an interval if it is = ∅.
A.9νC(·,k) cuts F (·,C) −R once from above, inŝ(C,k,R).
A (18) holds, that is
If as we increase s, F (s,C) increases, then because of the strict concavity of u,
It follows that the left hand side is decreasing in s, hence s * is unique.
The two condition of Corollary 4 are then fulfilled
Note that when P B and P are close to being equal and when the conditions of Corollary 5 hold, S * will continue to be an interval.
We can rewrite (18) as:
The following two sets of assumptions each imply that (19) has, for any k, C, and R, at most a single solution on the set whereνC(·,k) > F (·,C) −R:
is, for all C R, and k non-increasing in s;
A.11 (ii) c(s, C) is, for all C, non-decreasing in s;
A.11 (iii) For all C, k, and R,
is strictly decreasing in s
is, for all C and R non-increasing in s;
A.12 (ii) c(s, C) is, for all C, strictly increasing in s;
A.12 (iii) For all C, k, and R,
is non-increasing in s
To explain how we may arrive at A.11 (iii) or A.12 (iii) when we know thatν C (s, k) is strictly increasing in s, ∀C, k (a case which has our special interest), we may exploit the identity
By Assumption A.11 (i) or A.12 (i) , d∆ dx ≤ 0. Since u is strictly concave, we have
then A.11 (iii) holds. If (21) holds with weak inequality, A12 (iii) holds.
Examples of (21)
a which equals 0, when ∆ = 0. Next differentiating this expression w.r.t. ∆ we get
Since a < 1 and 0 < x − ∆ < x, it follows that (21) holds.
(
and (21) holds with weak inequality.
Conditions on Beliefs
We are interested in the case when the borrower is "optimistic" relative to the bank. We turn to defining this concept more precisely.
Suppose that the density, p of P is positive on [0, s], where possibly s = ∞ and that the Radon-Nikodym derivative
is differentiable.
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We shall explore the following condition:
If the Radon-Nikodym derivative,
is not differentiable, an equivalent condition to (22) is:
To see the relationship between the two conditions, consider the following
Lemma 3
Suppose f is continuous and (weakly) increasing. Then
If on the other hand (24) holds, then f is (weakly) increasing.
Proof: Writing out the derivative in (24) we get:
On the other hand, if f is not (weakly) increasing there iss <ŝ, s.t. on (s,ŝ), f is strictly decreasing. In that case, the expression The first order condition forν C (·, k) can be stated as:
for P -a.a. s, s .
If p(s) p B (s)
is differentiable, then (22) is equivalent toν C (·, k) being differentiable with a derivative, ∂ ∂sν C (s, k) > 0 which is continuous P -a.s. One more implication of (22) and (25) In the next example we develop a density that leads toν C (·, k) being increasing and strictly concave.
( 
Concluding Remarks
We have studied the form of the optimal financial contract under costly state verification making the natural assumptions of a risk averse borrower and diverse subjective expectations. In this more general setting the contract tends to become more complex since it has to be sensitive to both preferences and beliefs. When information is asymmetric resulting in incomplete markets, financial contracts act as substitutes for markets and under such conditions a financial contracts may have to serve multiple purposes. In our case the contract is not used only for the transfer of money between periods. It also provides an insurance vehicle and, in addition, permits agents to trade on their different assessments of the likelihood of future states of the world. Such multi faceted contracts clearly are what we find in today's financial markets. Of course, all the theoretical possibilities allowed in our abstract framework may not have exact real counterparts, since some features of contracts found in real markets depend not only on preferences and beliefs but also on the institutional setting. Moreover, real contracts may also depend on other types of asymmetric information not considered here.
In the final part of the paper we have provided conditions under which the optimal contract retains one feature which is often found in reality, namely that the region of observations (which can in that case be interpreted as a region of non-performance or bankruptcy) is a single interval consisting of low-outcome states. Such a contract has the important feature that the pay-off to the entrepreneur varies with the observed state. We have explained that this feature is often found in observed contracts. In our setting this conclusion flows directly from the nature of diverse beliefs.
